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In this paper, we analyze how the offshoring of services by Swedish firms is affected by 
corruption in target economies. The results suggest that firms avoid corrupt countries and that 
corruption reduces the amount of offshored services. In addition, the sensitivity to corruption 
is highest for poor countries, and large and internationalized firms are the ones that tend to be 
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In many countries, the service sector today accounts for two thirds of GDP or more, and 
services account for about twenty percent of world exports (Lejour and Smith 2008, 
UNCTAD 2009). The relatively low share of services in world exports can partly be 
explained by the fact that only ten percent of service output is traded, while the corresponding 
number for materials is over fifty percent. Lejour and Smith (2008) argue that this is not only 
due to non-tradability in services. They claim that services constitute a larger share than the 
directly measurable twenty percent of trade because services implicitly enter into trade as 
inputs in the production of traded goods. As an example, Lejour and Smith (2008) argue that 
in OECD countries, almost forty percent of the employment in the manufacturing sector can 
be considered as working with services.
2  
Despite the large and growing importance of the service sector, trade in services is 
relatively unexplored. Here, we analyze a specific type of trade in services, namely, imports 
of offshored services and how offshoring of services is affected by corruption in the target 
economies.  
From the perspective of international economics, corruption is often portrayed as a 
barrier to offshoring, trade and investment. The intuition why corruption have an impact on 
international offshoring of services is that offshoring does not occur without personal 
interaction (Nunn, 2007). For offshoring to occur, agents from different jurisdictions must 
agree on a contract. For the principal, one reason for engaging in corrupt behavior and to pay 
bribes for permits and services is that it can shorten lead times. However, the total cost of 
corruption can be difficult to predict because “deliverance” is uncertain and renewed “claims” 
can occur. It has also been found that corruption is correlated with opportunistic behavior and 
that theft and waste of project funds are relatively common in corrupt environments. 
Therefore, corruption increases needs for monitoring and control. Other uncertain costs 
include fines and costs that occur if an issue is taken to court. There is also a risk of missed 
contracts due to goodwill loss. Obviously, there’s a moral side that also needs to be 
considered. Bearing in mind that international offshoring can involve transfer of management 
control, decision making and firm-specific knowledge, it is plausible that corruption can be 
decisive in determining whether a cross-border relationship will be established. It should also 
                                                 
2 In the year 2000, the service sector’s contribution to total value added in the OECD countries was 70%, which 
was close to the service sector share for Sweden (69.4 percent) in the same year. The share of services in world 
exports has stayed around 20% during the last two decades (Lejour and Smith 2008, UNCTAD 2009). 3 
 
be considered that the impact of corruption is likely to be greatest when sensitive information 
is involved. For standardized tasks, corruption is less likely to be an issue.
3  
Turning to the service sector, it is argued that knowledge in that sector is closely related 
to people and, therefore, relatively difficult to protect by patents (Miles, 2006). Moreover, for 
services to be tradable, it is likely that they have the potential to be codified, standardized and 
modulated (fragmented). 
 There are no empirical studies on the relation between corruption and offshoring of 
services. One related exception is Niccolini (2007), who studies the impact of institutions on 
trade performed by US firms with their affiliates abroad (FDI/in-house offshoring). Niccolini 
(2007) finds that weak institutions hamper trade in intermediate goods, whereas the impact on 
final consumption goods is less clear. Considering that contract costs are greater when 
negotiating with an external supplier than with an agent within the corporation, these results 
may be indicative, although they may not fully capture cross-border, cross-firm contract costs. 
Contrary to offshoring and corruption, there are a series of papers analyzing FDI. For 
example, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Egger and Winner (2006) both find corruption to 
be detrimental to FDI. There seems to be evidence suggesting that the effect of corruption is 
nonuniform. Hakkala et al. (2008) find corruption to be more detrimental to horizontal FDI 
than to vertical FDI, and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) find corruption to alter the composition 
of FDI by shifting investment toward joint ventures rather than wholly owned affiliates. 
Dahlström and Johnson (2007) and Caetano and Calerio (2005) both find the impact of 
corruption on FDI to be negative and significant, but only for developing countries.  
Analyzing corruption and trade, Méon and Sekkat (2006) used the World Bank 
governance data of Kaufmann et al. (1999) and found that corruption, rule of law, government 
effectiveness and lack of political violence were all positively correlated with exports in 
manufactured goods. Similar results where found by Bandyopadhyay and Roy (2007). 
Acknowledging that corruption can be viewed as a general index of institutional quality, 
evidence suggests that weak institutions (a corrupt environment) hamper both inward FDI and 
trade. 
We add to this literature in several ways. First, by explicitly focusing on corruption and 
offshoring of services, we analyze a relationship that has been overlooked by the empirical 
literature. 
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Second, research is lacking on how the sensitivity to corruption differs across different 
types of firms. We analyze whether large global firms with international networks react 
differently to corruption than other firms.  
Third, we analyze whether the impact of corruption is uniform across rich and poor 
countries and different types of services.  
Finally, our analysis is based on detailed firm-level data combined with country data. 
These types of detailed data are rare in the previous literature. The data allow us to apply 
several different econometric approaches, thus limiting the risk that the results will be driven 
by the choice of econometric method. 
The results of this study suggest that corruption is a deterrent for both the choice of 
destination country and the volume of offshored services. Moreover, the negative impact of 
corruption is the highest for poor countries, while large and internationalized firms seem to 
use their flexibility to avoid corrupt countries. Taken together, this adds yet another argument 
for the importance of fighting corruption.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, outsourcing, services, corruption and the 
theoretical link between corruption and service offshoring are discussed, and in section 3, we 
present the data and the gravity model and discuss econometric considerations. The results are 
given in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Concepts and the link between offshoring and corruption 
2.1 Services 
When thinking about services, one should note that the service sector contains a wide set of 
industries including, for example, retail trade, telecommunication, transportation, renting of 
machinery, finance, insurance, real estate, hotels and restaurants. The diversity of the service 
sector has been highlighted by Miles (2006) and Howells and Tether (2004), who claim that 
some services are more like manufacturing in the sense that they are technology intensive or 
involved in the production of materials.
4 Despite the heterogeneity, however, there are some 
fundamental differences between manufacturing and services. As is well known, many 
services are intangible, invisible and perishable (Mattoo and Stern 2008). This means that 
service activities often are non-storable and less tradable than material goods (Mattoo and 
Stern 2008; Miles, 2006). However, many business services including technical drawings, call 
                                                 
4 As Drucker (1977) points out, non-technological innovations “are at least as important as technological 
innovations.” 5 
 
centers, computer programs and engineering designs, are highly tradable and therefore easily 
offshored. 
Among the characteristics that are recognized to increase the tradability of a service is 
the possibility to codify, standardize and fragment the service into modules. These trade-
enhancing characteristics also enhance the possibility to vertically fragment the production 
and outsource parts of the production of a service. The creation of Internet webpages, rather 
than IT services in general, can be taken as one such example (Miles, 2006). We might here 
note that progress made in the IT sector has played a key role for the growing trade in services 
and that in contrast to the manufacturing sector, knowledge in the service sector is closely 
related to people and, therefore, relatively difficult to protect by patents (Miles, 2006). Hence, 
for offshoring of services containing sensitive information to take place, a key issue to 
consider is how to avoid opportunistic behavior and to protect the knowledge from leakage, 
which leads us to corruption. 
 
2.2 Corruption 
Although the term corruption is well known, it is difficult to find a precise and commonly 
accepted definition of it. A common theme is that corruption involves misuse of public 
officials for private gain in a way that alters the rules. Corruption is often divided into grand 
corruption and petty corruption, where grand corruption refers to situations where the political 
elite exploit their power for economic gain, while petty corruption refers to how appointed 
bureaucrats handle their responsibilities (Kain, 2004). If the cost of corruption is about money 
and the ability to pay, it may be argued that large firms are better equipped than small firms to 
handle a corrupt environment because they have the ability to pay and have greater bargaining 
power. 
  Corruption may also occur in daily business life without any direct intervention from 
public agents. Therefore, we may add a dimension where corrupt behavior occurs among 
individuals who are in control of assets that are not their own (e.g., business people that make 
decisions on behalf of the owners of capital). This wider scope of corruption is reflected in the 
perceived corruption measures used here.  
Arguments that corruption is detrimental to an economy include the ideas that corruption 
leads to a misallocation of contracts and that resources are reallocated from the most efficient 
agents to less efficient ones. That is, even if corruption is viewed as an auction, there is no 
guarantee that the most efficient bidder is willing to lay the highest bid. Or, as noted by Rose-
Ackerman (1997), the highest briber may be the one who is most willing to compromise on 6 
 
quality. Corruption also increases the uncertainty under which firms are working, increases 
the costs in terms of time and money spent on bribery and complicates contractual relations. 
In addition, there is a social, legal and moral dimension of corruption. Hence, corruption not 
only increases the cost of operating in a country but also affect subcontracting relations. The 
opposite view, that corruption may be beneficial for an economy, rests on the assumptions 
that governmental officials can be more helpful when paid directly and that corruption allows 
business people to avoid restrictions that would otherwise discourage investments.
5 Hence, 
the extent to which corruption is harmful for business life and growth is partly an empirical 
issue.  
 
2.3 The link between service offshoring and corruption  
Offshoring is defined as outsourcing an activity or a task to a foreign entity. This, in turn 
includes (i) outsourced offshoring (outsourcing to a foreign external supplier) and (ii) in-
house offshoring (vertical FDI—within the corporation). 
One influential theoretical framework for analyzing the offshoring decisions of firms is 
the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) property rights model.
6 In this model, ownership is the key 
for trade in different types of goods. Based on GHM, Antràs (2003) built a property-rights 
model for outsourcing in which he demonstrated that it is relatively difficult to outsource 
capital-intensive inputs.  
Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005) showed that 
firms not only have to choose between producing in-house or outside the firm (outsource) but 
also between producing at home or abroad. Moreover, low-productivity firms outsource 
domestically, while mid-productivity firms can outsource from foreign suppliers. At the top of 
the ladder we find the highest-productivity firms that may chose vertical FDI. Further, 
Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005) showed that a good contracting environment improves 
the probability of offshoring, often at the expense of FDI. Antràs (2005) claimed that as a 
product or service becomes routinized, the firm first considers FDI, and when the product has 
become sufficiently standardized, the firm may decide to outsource to an external supplier. 
Finally, Antràs and Staiger (2012) shows that economic integration of particular importance 
for offshoring to take place.  From this it is straightforward to see that firms’ are expected to 
primarily consider offshoring of routinized and simple tasks to corrupt countries while 
                                                 
5 See e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Wei (2005). 
6 See, e.g., Hart and Moore (1990), Grossman, Sanford and Hart (1986) and Hart (1995). 7 
 
advanced tasks are more likely to be directed to corruption free enviroments (Antràs and 
Helpman, 2006). 
The contract issue concerns not only the offshoring partner but also the receiver. The 
standard hold-up problem recognizes that the receiving partner must often make contract-
specific investments, Williamsson (2000) and Hart (1995). When complete contracts cannot 
be enforced, this will lead to underinvestment. Here, it is understood that corruption works as 
an obstacle, reducing the trust of the system, and therefore, aggravating the problem of 
underinvestment, see, e.g., Ornelas and Turner (2008). Another way to look at this issue is to 
consider who the legal proprietor is. If the supplier is the legal proprietor of a service product, 
then it is the supplier who takes the risk that intellectual property rights may be foregone. In a 
corrupt country, this risk is typically higher than in less corrupt countries. If, however, the 
client is the legal proprietor, the risk of taking damage mainly falls on the client. In any case, 
corruption reduces the probability that a corrupt country will be chosen as a target country. 
Corruption not only makes the country less attractive, but it also affects the pool of firms that 
are able to compete for offshoring contracts. 
To empirically tackle issues that involve various types of trade, the gravity model of 
trade has proven to be a good point of departure, and therefore, we continue with a discussion 
of that model.  
  
3. The gravity model, firm-level gravity, data and empirical strategy 
The gravity is today a well-established vehicle for empirically analyzing trade flows, and the 
model has developed into other trade-related areas such as analyses of FDI (see, e.g., De 
Mello-Sampayo, (2005, 2009), Hejazi, (2005, 2009), and Shigeru and Umemura (2003)). 
Here, we analyze a specific type of trade, namely firms’ imports of offshore services. In its 





r M ) ( , where  ij M are 
imports from country i to country j,  j iY Y  is the joint economic mass,  ij d is distance between 
countries, and T(r)—in the simple specification—is a proportionality constant (Overman et 
al., 2003). 
To capture trade remoteness and trade resistance, we include our key variable 
corruption as well as distance, various fixed effect variables (discussed below) and tariff rates 
defined at the most disaggregated (product) level. To control for income and that wealthy 
countries tend to use a larger share of their income on tradables we include population (see 8 
 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Bergstrand (1989)). To account for firm-level gravity 
and size effects, we apply the log of firm sales. Finally, to control for multinationality (MNE) 
we add a MNE dummy variable. The assumption is that firms that are already multinational 
(and have overcome the cost of crossing the border) have an advantage over purely national 
firms in arranging offshoring contracts. Direct inclusion of the full set of country-fixed effects 
makes it hard to estimate the impact of time-invariant effects. Instead, we take the commonly 
used approach and apply region-fixed effects (22 regions) to the model.
7 With this as a 
background, a baseline OLS equation takes the following form: 
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Here, Oijt are imports by firm i of offshored services from country j, and Γis a set of F firm 
characteristics including total factor productivity, MNE status and sales. Target country 
characteristics T include GDP and population. Ω contains measures of trade resistance 
including distance, tariffs, and corruption, Φ  is the Mills inverse ratio (IMR) controlling for 




3.1 Econometric considerations 
In the estimation of the gravity model, there is no single estimation technique that has been 
shown to uniformly outperform all the alternatives. We therefore apply a set of different 
estimators and model specifications which allow us to evaluate the robustness of our results. 
This motivates a brief discussion of possible pitfalls.  
As highlighted by the heterogeneous firm model (Melitz, 2003) points out that all firms 
are not equal and selection into offshoring is not random.
9 A straightforward extension of this 
argument suggests that a Heckman type of model may be appropriate.
10 Elaborating on the 
                                                 
7 See the Appendix for details on the 22 regions. The issue of unit and country-fixed effects will be further 
analyzed using Fixed Effect Variance Decomposition models, see below. 
8 See the Appendix for variable definitions and sources.  
9 Today, the heterogeneous firm model has emerged as the workhorse model of micro patterns of trade. For 
example, Melitz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Chaney (2008) show how the 
interaction between firm-level productivity, fixed costs and barriers to trade governs the penetration into export 
markets. 
10 For the exclusion restriction, we use data on skill intensity and export intensity of the firm. Testing for the 
exclusion restriction indicates that these variables are valid. Bernard and Jensen (2004) is an example in which 
skill intensity has been used to explain selection with respect to internationalization. The idea is that highly 9 
 
heterogeneous firm model, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (HMR) (2008) describe how 
changes in trade are related to fixed costs and changes in the intensive and the extensive 
margins of trade. They propose an extended Heckman model as a way to handle the bias that 
will be induced if the margins are not controlled for. We will apply the Heckman model 
including the HMR specification.  
An alternative and increasingly popular method of handling zeros and selection is to 
turn to multiplicative count data models as these naturally allow zeros to enter the model (see 
Santos, Silva and Tenreyo (2006)). Among the family of multiplicative models capable of 
handling excess zeros, test suggest the zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB).
11 Two 
appealing features of the ZINB model are that it is less sensitive to heteroskedasticity than the 
Heckman model and that it does not rely on an exclusion restriction (Santos, Silva and 
Tenreyo (2006)). 
Another issue, highlighted by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), is fixed effects. They 
demonstrated that the traditional specification of the gravity model suffers from an omitted 
variable bias. Anderson and Van Wincoop argued that the inclusion of importer and exporter 
fixed effects, would yield consistent parameter estimates. However, there is also a cost for 
using fixed effects because they eliminate time invariant information in the data. For example, 
geographical distance is time invariant and will therefore drop out from fixed-effects 
regressions. In addition, variables such as corruption quality exhibit little variation over time 
and will therefore be estimated with large standard errors when using only within variation. In 
our context, this is unfortunate because cross-sectional differences help us understand the 
relationship between corruption and offshoring. Furthermore, the Heckman model is not 
defined under a fixed effect framework (Greene, 2001).  
A common way to handle fixed effects is to include various region-specific dummy 
variables, so that some fixed effects are controlled for while simultaneously keeping the key 
variables of the model in the estimations.  
An alternative solution of how to handle fixed effects has been suggested by Plümper 
and Troeger (2007, 2011). They present the fixed-effects variance decomposition (FEVD) 
estimator as a way to handle time-invariant and slowly changing variables in a fixed-effects 
model framework. The idea of the FEVD estimator is to extract the residuals from a fixed-
effects model, construct a variable that captures unobserved heterogeneity and use this as a 
                                                                                                                                                          
productive and skill-intensive firms are more internationalized than other firms. Similarly, exporters have 
overcome the internationalization barrier and are therefore more likely to engage in international offshoring. 
11 See the results section. 10 
 
regressor, thereby controlling for fixed effects. This allows us to control for fixed effects and 
simultaneously use cross-sectional variation. However, several researchers have recently 
questioned the FEVD model (Greene (2011a; 2011b) and Breusch et al. (2011a; 2011b)).
12 
We apply the FEVD estimator in a Heckman framework and use the results to explore 
whether results from models with region dummies are robust as compared to a FEVD 
specification where unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for.
13  
   
3.2 Data 
The analysis is based on Swedish firm-level data that are matched with a set of country 
characteristics. Firm-level data consist of a set of linked register-based data sets from 
Statistics Sweden: the financial statistics data (FS) and the Regional Labor Market Statistics 
(RAMS) provide us with information on firms’ inputs and results, such as sales, value added, 
capital stock, number of employees, education, ownership and industry affiliation.  
Data on imports of services cover all service transactions and all firms. Trade in 
services is collected by the Swedish Riksbank and is separated into eleven categories. Our 
analysis deals with offshoring and we therefore exclude; public services, insurances, 
personally delivered services, cultural services, travel funds and transportation services from 
our definition of offshored services. Hence, following Crinò (2007) (except for the exclusion 
of insurances), we measure offshored services as imports of; communication services, 
financial services, computer and information services, royalties and license fees and other 
business services. To these groups, we also append construction services (which has become 
increasingly internationalized).
14  
Prior to 2003, data on trade in services was collected by the Swedish Riksbank and 
covered all firms, but since 2003 the data collection is overtaken by Statistics Sweden, and 
since then, only for a sample of firms. In addition, the matching of the different service 
categories registered by the Swedish Riksbank and Statistics Sweden is uncertain.  
                                                 
12 The criticism of the FEVD estimators is based on their asymptotic properties and bias, and suggests that they 
underestimate standard errors and that the FEVD model is a special case of the Hausman-Taylor IV procedure. 
In defense of the FEVD model, Plümper and Troeger (2007, 2011) emphasize the finite sample properties and 
illustrate its advantages with an extensive set of Monte Carlo simulations. The debate suggests that there are 
reasons to be cautious in the interpretation of results from the FEVD estimator. We use it as a robustness test. 
13 For an individual firm, the level of corruption and the other country characteristics are likely to be taken as 
given. We have applied the commonly used approach of lagged covariates to handle endogeniety. According to 
the definition of strong exogeneity, shocks in period (t) have no impact on (t-1) (which could be the case if there 
was perfect foresight). See, e.g., Hendry (1995) and Greenaway et al. (2008). The estimate of corruption is 
almost unaffected and remains positive and strongly significant. Results available on request. 
14 As a robustness test, we will consider different sub-groups of service offshoring (see Table 4) 11 
 
Country characteristics are collected from the World Bank. For corruption, we use the 
Governance Indicators corruption index developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) and supplied by 
the World Bank, a higher value indicates less corruption, and we therefore label the 
corruption variable used in the regressions as “corruption freeness”. Additional country 
characteristics include population and GDP collected from the World Bank database. Tariff 
data are obtained from the UNCTAD/TRAINS database, and for distance, we use the CEPII 
distance measure, which is weighted so as to take internal distances and population dispersion 
into account.
15 For details of the variables, see the Appendix. Due to different time frames for 





Comparing firms that enter into service offshoring relationships and those that do not, Table 
A2 reveals that offshoring firms are relatively large, productive
16, skill intensive and 
overrepresented by MNEs. This is expected because entering into service offshoring 
relationships requires the firm to overcome a number of obstacles associated with entering 
international markets. Further, out of 3.6 million observed firm-country pairs, only about 
41,000 observations (or 1.1 percent) are nonzero trade flows. Looking at firms involved in 
service offshoring most firms’ offshore services from one country (38%), or only a handful of 
countries. Looking at top offshorers, the top two percent firms are sourcing from more than 




Considering the large fraction of zero and self selection into offshoring our point of departure 
is a set of selection models.  
 
    [Table 1 about here] 
 
In Table 1 we present the regression results. All estimations include 21 region dummies, 
industry dummies at the 2-digit level and year fixed effects. Control variables are Distance, 
                                                 
15 More information on CEPII’s distance measure is found in Mayer and Zignago (2006). 
16 TFP is measured by the Törnquist index. For details, see the appendix and Karpaty and Tingvall (2010).  12 
 
GDP, Population, Tariffs, MNE status, Firm size, and Firm TFP. The same probit/selection 
model is applied in all selection models; hence the selection equation is presented just once.
17 
The selection equation suggests that corruption is a deterrent for the choice of the target 
country.  
As pointed out by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and others, fixed effects may be 
of importance. The Heckman model not is defined in a fixed model set-up and might therefore 
suffer from an omitted variable bias. To analyze whether control for unobservable fixed 
effects alters the results we apply the FEVD model. The FEVD is a special case of the 
Hausman-Taylor IV method where we control for unobservables by including a vector of 
estimated unobservable fixed effects as a right hand side regressor (the variance 
decomposition variable (￿), here in a Heckman selection model framework (Breusch et al. 
(2011a; 2011b; Plümper and Troeger (2007; 2011)). 
Comparing results from the Heckman-FEVD model with the standard Heckman model 
and the HMR specification reveals that even though estimations with regional fixed effects do 
not absorb all fixed effects, the results are not affected. To be precise, moving from the 
Heckman model to the HMR specification and the Heckman FEVD model the estimated 
impact of corruption is decreased from 0.12 to 0.10 and 0.08 respectively; in all 
specifications, the impact of corruptions is highly significant.
18  
To further analyze the robustness of results we apply the ZINB estimator which allows 
us to relax the exclusion restriction criteria and to directly include all zeros in the estimation. 
Results from the ZINB model in Table 1 are in line with the log linear models suggesting that 
corruption is a deterrent to service offshoring though the estimated impact of corruption is 
about twice as high in the ZINB model as compared to the Heckman model.  
Turning to the control variables, we note that most of the control variables are 
significant with the expected sign. Nearby countries with large markets attract offshoring; 
multinational-, large- and productive firms seem to be more prevalent to enter into service 
offshoring relationships than are other firms. Some less expected results are the lack of 
significance of tariffs and the population variable.  
 
                                                 
17  In the Heckman specifications variables used as exclusion restrictions; the share of skilled labor and export 
intensity are highly significant, and significant results for the Mills ratio and the test of independent equation 
(rho = 0) suggests that selection into service offshoring is not random and that the selection models are justified. 
18 R
2 is highest in the FEVD model suggesting that unit effects contain information but that the quantitative 
results not are altered. The estimate of the variance decomposition variable has the expected value on 1. 13 
 
4.3 Heterogeniety 
To the extent that corruption works as a fixed cost, large firms should be better equipped than 
small firms to handle corruption, not only because they can afford to pay, but also because of 
their bargaining power. A hypothesis would therefore be that large firms, MNEs and 
experienced service offshorers should be relatively well equipped to handle a corrupt 
environment. On the other hand, these relatively powerful firms can, with relative ease, use 
their networks and relocate away from difficult markets. The alternative hypothesis is 
therefore that they are not less but more sensitive to corruption than are other firms. To some 
extent, it is therefore an empirical question whether the sensitivity to corruption differs 
between various types of firms.  
 
    [Table 2 about here] 
 
The results for different types of firms are presented in the left panel in Table 2. As shown 
above, results are not sensitive to the choice of estimation technique and to save space we 
continue and present results from Heckman models only.  
The overall conclusion from results in Table 2 is that the selection sensitivity does not 
differ greatly between different types of firms whereas there are indications of a systematic 
difference on the intensive margin. Looking at the volume, large firms, MNEs and firms 
offshoring services to many markets are all relatively sensitive to corruption. The estimated 
sensitivity is positive for large firms and even negative for small firms. Comparing MNEs and 
non-MNEs a similar pattern occurs; non-MNEs seem to be (significantly) attracted to corrupt 
countries whereas the impact is non-significant for MNEs. Given that the sample of non-
MNES, by definition, excludes the possibility of in-house offshoring, we would therefore 
expect these firms to be more rather than less sensitive to corruption than are other firms. 
Hence, these results strengthen our previous findings that large and internationalized firms 
use their experience and networks to avoid corrupt countries. This line of reasoning is further 
backed up when we group firms with respect to how many countries they are sourcing from. 
The more countries a firms is sourcing, from, the higher is the sensitivity on the intensive 
margin.  
To sum up, the difference across different types of firms in their sensitivity to 
corruption is more pronounced in the volume equation than in the selection. One 
interpretation is therefore that firms do not fully consider the downside of corruption before 
they enter a market and therefore do ex post volume adjustments. Since large multinationals 14 
 
have a greater network and more sourcing alternatives, if they find a market cumbersome, 
they can at a low cost adjust volumes and compensate using alternative suppliers.  
The possibility to draw on low wages is a key argument for offshoring.
19 We therefore 
continue and in the right panel in Table 2 separate countries with respect to income levels. 
Again, looking at the selection there is no apparent systematic differences while results for the 
intensive margin suggest that volumes are most sensitive to corruption in poor countries. 
Because large firms and MNEs are the ones that enter into large scale service offshoring and 
these firms are the most sensitive to corruption, this adds yet another argument for the 
importance of fighting corruption, especially in poor and heavily corrupt countries.  
Finally we in Table 2 analyze the service- vs. manufacturing firm division. The results 
are clear; service sector firms are less sensitive to corruption on the intensive margin while 
there is no clear difference in the selection.  
As discussed above, high tech services are likely to be more sensitive to corruption than 
services not containing sensitive information. However, the tradability of services also 
matters. For a given level of sensitive information, services that are easily traded are more 
likely to be offshored than services that are difficult to trade. To investigate this issue further 
we therefore analyze each group of offshored service, as classified by Statistics Sweden. The 
different classes are: Communication services, Royalties and licenses fees, Computer and 
information services, Financial services, Other business services and Construction services. 
That is, we have results for various types of business services and construction services. The 
results are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Again, results in Table 3 do not reveal any great differences in the selection step whereas the 
volume equation support some of the arguments put forward previously. The highest 
sensitivity against corruption is found for communication services, royalties and licenses fees, 
computer and information services which are services that can be characterized as knowledge 
intensive.  The lowest sensitivity against corruption is found for other business services and 
construction services which are categories that are less likely to contain sensitive information. 
A maybe surprising result is the negative coefficient found for financial services indicating 
that offshoring destinations of financial services is overrepresented by relatively corrupt 
                                                 
19 Other motives for offshoring include e.g. the possibility to draw on specialized suppliers, risk- and cost 
minimization. 15 
 
countries. A possible explanation to this result may be that tax regulations (that we lack 
information on) may override corruption. To sum up, we are inclined to suggest that 
knowledge intensive services are more sensitive to corruption than other services. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyzed how corruption in target economies affects offshoring of services 
by Swedish firms. To be precise, we analyzed how corruption affects the choice of country 
and the volume and composition of offshored services. To this end, we used detailed Swedish 
firm-level including detailed information on trade in services that are data combined with a 
set of country characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper tackling this 
issue empirically. 
During the analysis, we tackle the selection and “zero-valued trade” problem and the 
fixed effects issue. Using different estimators and model specifications we make sure that the 
results not are driven by the choice of a specific estimator. Applied models include the 
Heckman model, The HMR specification of the Heckman model, the ZINB estimator and a 
FEVD model applied in a selection model framework. Throughout these operations the results 
are clear. Corruption is a deterrent for both the choice of country and, given that a country has 
been selected, for the amount of services offshored. However, the impact of corruption is not 
uniformly distributed across different types of firms and countries.  
Large firms, MNEs and firms offshoring to several countries are more sensitive to 
corruption than are other firms. This suggests that large firms use their international network 
to relocate from cumbersome markets. In addition, results suggest that the impact of 
corruption is most severe for poor countries. Considering that many heavily corrupt countries 
also are relatively poor and that large firms are both sensitive to corruption and important 
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 Table 1. Offshoring of services and corruption.  
Dependent variable, imports of offshored services, 1997-2002. 
Variable  Heckman  HMR  Heckman
FEVD 
ZINB 


















       































































































Share skill high  1.3843 
(0.016)
*** 
-- -- -- -- 
Export ratio  0.6761 
(0.010)
*** 
--  --  --  -- 










--  --  --  1.000 
***  -- 
z, z
2, z
3  -- --  yes  -- -- 
Industry dum.  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Period dum.  yes yes yes yes yes 
Region dum.  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R
2  -- --  0.15  0.79  -- 
Obs.  3 628 776  41 632  41 632  41 632  3 628 776 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by country-year within parenthesis (.). 
*,
 **,
 ***, indicates significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Firms with at least 50 employees. p-val indep equations = 0.000. 




Table 2. Heterogeniety. Heckman models. 
Dependent variable, imports of offshored services, 1997-2002. 
  Estimated impact of corruption 
    Sample   Selection  Target eq.    Selection  Target eq. 
Sample: Firms with  
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Note. Robust standard errors clustered by country-year within parenthesis (.). 
*,
 **,
 ***, indicates significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Firms with at least 50 employees. All models include full variable set-
up including firm-, country-, trade resistance variables and region-, industry, and period dummies, see Table 2. 
 
 
Table 3. Service offshoring and corruption. By type of offshored service. Heckman models. 
Heterogeneity  Estimated impact of corruption 
   Service industry   Selection  Target eq. 



































Note. Robust standard errors clustered by country-year within parenthesis (.). 
*,
 **,
 ***, indicates significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Firms with at least 50 employees.  
All models include a full variable set-up including firm-, country-, trade resistance variables and region-, 






Table A1. Variable description 
Variable Mean  Stdv(be/within) 
Country characteristics 
ln(GDP)  24.01 37.0 
ln(population)  16.09  77.1 
Firm characteristics 
ln(service offshoring)  7.227  1.70 
ln(sales)  12.01 4.90 
ln(TFP)  6.948  2.18 
Share skilled labor  0.231 7.72 
MNE  0.406  2.08 
Export ratio  0.176 2.59 
Trade resistance
Tariffs  0.006 2.36 
ln(distance)  8.364  -- 
Corruption free  0.133 14.0
 
 
Table A2. Firm characteristics. 








1 destination  37  ln(service offshoring)  -- 
5 destinations  77 MNE  2.07 
10 destinations  91  ln(sales)  1.08 
20 destinations  98  ln(TFP) 1.06 
50 destinations  100  Share skilled labour  1.76 
Max no of simultaneous offshoring destinations observed by a single firm. 119 
 
 
Table A3. Variables, construction and source 
Variable  Definition  Source
Country characteristics 
ln(GDP)  ln(GDP), constant 200 USD.  World Bank 
ln(population)  ln(Total population).  World Bank 
Firm characteristics
ln(service offshoring)
(A)  Imports of services   The Swedish Riksbank 
ln(sales)  ln(sales), constant prices.  Statistics Sweden - Financial statistics 
ln(TFP)  Törnquist index, see Table notes. Statistics Sweden – Financial statistics
Share skilled labor  Share of employees with at least tertiary 
education. 
Statistics Sweden – RAMS 
MNE  Swedish MNE or foreign owned firms  
(at least 50% of votes in foreign control).   
Statistics Sweden - Financial statistics 
Resistance to trade 
Tariffs  Weighted tariff rate by industry and 
country. 
UNCTAD/TRAINS 
ln(distance)  CEPII weighted distance measure.  CEPII 
Corruption clean (WB)  The World Bank Kaufman index of 
perceived corruption. 
World Bank 
Note: Total factor productivity. We use the Divisia Törnqvist to calculate changes in firms’ input mix (a non 
parametric approach which corresponds to a Translog production function. We calculate TFP as the ratio of 
deflated sales value to an index of input volumes (a Törnqvist quantity index of inputs). This index fulfills 
important properties such as invariance and independence. For details of the calculation of the productivity 
index, see Karpaty and Tingvall (2010). 
 